Holy Week: "7 Days that Shook the World"

The Anchoress posts a good read:

"7 Days that Shook the World" by Greg Kandra

After spending the last few weeks in the desert of Lent, suddenly we find ourselves in an oasis, clutching long leaves of palms.

But like so many things you see after being in the desert, it’s a mirage. What we see, or think we see, is about to shift before our eyes.

Soon enough, the palms will be whips. The leaves will be thorns. Jubilation will become jeers. That is the paradox and the mystery of Holy Week.

The liturgies of this week are powerful and primal. In the days to come, there is silence and smoke, fire and water, shadow and light. We are a part of something both ancient and new, and what we do this week reminds us of that. The altar will be stripped. The cross will be venerated. The tabernacle will be emptied. The Blessed Sacrament will be moved. Bells will be stilled.

And yet here we stand, at the gates to Jerusalem, palms in our hands and hosannas on our lips, beginning the arduous trek to Calvary.

...

This week, take the time to wonder about what we are doing, and what we are remembering. For close to two thousand years, we have gathered like this, in places like this, to light candles and chant prayers and read again the ancient stories of our deliverance and redemption.

But are we aware of what we are doing? Do we understand what it means? Do we realize the price that was paid? A proper accounting is impossible. The ledger—His life, for our souls—seems woefully unbalanced.

So try this. This week, take a moment in each day that passes to wonder: What was He doing during this time of that one week all those centuries ago? What was crossing His mind on Monday, on Tuesday, on Wednesday? What sort of anguish? What kind of dread?

...

He was a man like us in all things but sin. He must have been terrified, His mind buzzing with questions. Long after the others had drifted off to sleep, did He stay awake and worry? Maybe He sat up alone, late at night, whittling a piece of wood, the way His father had taught Him, until a splinter sliced His skin, drawing a rivulet of blood. He might have flinched and thought: Well, this is nothing. And still it stings. How intense would the pain of death become? How long would it last? How much humiliation would He be forced to endure, stripped and bleeding? And: What about His mother? Is there anything He could do to spare her from this?

As you shop for Easter baskets and dye, think of this. Ponder this. Wonder about it. Make it a kind of prayer.

And then, remember what we are doing, and why.

Because, of all the calendars in all of human history, this is the week that changed the world.

Aquinas and the Ontological Argument

From time to time, I have heard people say that one of St. Thomas Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God is the ontological argument. Each time, I wonder where this person got that info because Aquinas, in some prominent places, makes it quite clear that he disagrees with the ontological argument ... and the ontological argument itself is based upon a way of thinking, a set of philosophical principles, that are antithetical to Aquinas's own philosophy and approach to life.

In light of that I thought I would gather some citations from Aquinas where he disagrees with versions of what is now called the ontological argument. After Anselm, the other big medieval thinkers who some say posit a form of the ontological argument are Bonaventure in his Commentary on I Sentences (d. 8, p. I, a. I, q.2) and in his De Mysterio Trinitatis (q. I, a. I) and Duns Scotus in his Ordinatio (I, 2, 1-2, nos. 137-139). I say “some” because with regard to Scotus others say his proof starts from what is experienced and therefore should not be categorized as “ontological” in the way that word is now understood.

The basic argument of Aquinas is that we cannot argue from a knowledge of essence of something, even God, to the conclusion that it exists. It exists only as a mental being, kind of like Kant's ens rationis.

The places where Aquinas argues against ontological-type proofs for God’s existence are:

Summa contra Gentiles, I, 11 (especially nos. 3-4). This chapter comes after having presented various forms of (“ontological”) arguments that are based upon the notion that once one understands what the name “God” means one will have to conclude God’s existence is self-evident, being a necessity of what the essence “God” contains. (cf. SCG, I, 10) It could be the case that because Aquinas presents his opponents’ arguments with great charity that some conclude they are his arguments. If one keeps reading his texts, however, it becomes apparent that he was just presenting an argument that some make because he then refutes them. Here is SCG, I, 11:

1. THE above opinion [ontological-type arguments that were stated in SCG, I, 10] arises partly from custom, men being accustomed from the beginning to hear and invoke the name of God. Custom, especially that which is from the beginning, takes the place of nature; hence notions wherewith the mind is imbued from childhood are held as firmly as if they were naturally known and self-evident.

2. Partly also it owes its origin to the neglect of a distinction between what is self-evident of itself absolutely and what is self-evident relatively to us. Absolutely indeed the existence of God is self-evident, since God's essence is His existence. But since we cannot mentally conceive God's essence, his existence is not self-evident relatively to us. …

3. Nor is the existence of God necessarily self-evident as soon as the meaning of the name 'God' is known. First, because it is not evident, even to all who admit the existence of God, that God is something greater than which nothing can be conceived, since many of the ancients said that this world was God. Then granting that universal usage understands by the name 'God' something greater than which nothing can be conceived, it will not follow that there exists in rerum natura something greater than which nothing can be conceived. For 'thing' and "notion implied in the name of the thing" must answer to one another. From the conception in the mind of what is declared by this name 'God' it does not follow that God exists otherwise than in the mind. Hence there will be no necessity either of that something, greater than which nothing can be conceived, existing otherwise than in the mind; and from this it does not follow that there is anything in rerum natura greater than which nothing can be conceived. And so the supposition of the nonexistence of God goes untouched. For the possibility of our thought outrunning the greatness of any given object, whether of the actual or of the ideal order, has nothing in it to vex the soul of any one except of him alone who already grants the existence in rerum natura of something than which nothing can be conceived greater.

In a footnote in one edition of the translation, the editor writes:

St Thomas means: 'If I form a notion of a thing, and then get a name to express that notion, it does not follow that the thing, answering to such name and notion, exists.' St Anselm's disciples reply: 'True of the notions of all other things, as islands or dollars, which may or may not be; but not true of the notion of that one thing, whereof existence is a very part of the notion.' In other words, whereas St Thomas denies the lawfulness of the transition from the ideal to the actual order, they maintain that the transition is lawful in arguing the existence of that one Being, who is the actuality of all that is ideal. 'But is such actuality possible?' 'It is conceivable, therefore possible.' 'It may be conceivable, only because it is conceived inadequately, without insight into the inconsistencies which it involves.' 'You have no right to assume inconsistencies where you discern none,' rejoins Leibnitz. And so this 'ontological argument' will be tossed up and down, as an apple of discord, to the end.

Aquinas continues:

4. Nor is it necessary for something greater than God to be conceivable, if His non-existence is conceivable. For the possibility of conceiving Him not to exist does not arise from the imperfection or uncertainty of His Being, since His Being is of itself most manifest, but from the infirmity of our understanding, which cannot discern Him as He is of Himself, but only by the effects which He produces; and so it is brought by reasoning to the knowledge of Him.

Summa Theologica, Ia, 2, I, ad 2. Here he gives a summary of part of the above argument, saying that the claim “God’s existence is self-evident” is not true for us. In Objection 2, he gives his opponents’ argument, once again leading some to think it is his.

Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.

In the main body of the article, he argues against such claims, saying that since we are limited creatures and cannot see the divine essence in itself, knowledge of what the name “God” means does not convert into knowledge of God’s existence.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature--namely, by effects.

Then in a response to “Objection 2” above, Aquinas offers a criticism of what is called the ontological argument. He argues similarly as he did in SCG:

Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Well, I think you get the idea of Aquinas’s view of the ontological argument or forms of it: he does not think they are possible for our minds. He deals with it also to some extent in In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4m; De Veritate, X, 12, ad 2m; and offers the principles used to argue against ontological arguments in On Being and Essence, especially chapter 4 where he also gives an argument for God’s existence based on the essence-existence (esse) distinction in composed beings.

I included the texts so you could see and verify for yourself that Aquinas disagrees with those who put forth any form of an ontological argument. Kant and Aquinas are not too far apart in their rejection of this type of argument for God's existence, however much they disagree with other arguments for the existence of God.

Summer Project: Equality, Justice, and Freedom

I just submitted a proposal for summer research. Here is what I intend to do this summer:

TITLE OF PROPOSED RESEARCH: “Equality’s Just Place in the Human Person’s Quest for Freedom: Investigating the Interplay of Equality, Justice, and Freedom”

Description:

In both the contemporary literature on political philosophy and in the daily discourse of many Americans, there is an ongoing debate over the meaning and role that equality should play in our lives, both as private citizens and as members of a public society. One person advocates political changes in order to achieve greater equality for a certain group. Another seeks revocation of current laws in an attempt to rectify alleged unjust policies. All these are done while referencing “equality,” “justice,” and even “freedom,” though these demands come from quite polarized political viewpoints. Various notions of equality are applied in these discussions. In addition, there are differences in what people think a government’s role and purpose is. Some view equality and a more contemporary notion of justice as the goals of government whereas others view a more traditional understanding of justice as government’s goal in its attempt to provide the framework so its citizens may reach their own political end: liberty.[1] Equality. Justice. Liberty. They are inter-related, indeed. The question is how. The problem is knowing their limits.

In this project, I plan to discuss the major disputes over equality. I will investigate the various and often opposing views on the matter, engaging the works of liberal, conservative, communitarian, and libertarian thinkers. In an effort to understand better the value and place of equality, I will further probe the meaning and scope of justice. With a clear definition of justice, it will then be easier to discuss the main types of equality. Through this discussion, I hope to make clear which forms of equality a government, political theorist, or civic-minded person should be concerned with when discussing what is best for a people called to be free and to do so in a way that respects the dignity of the human person.

This is part of a larger goal of mine, one that seeks to develop and communicate an approach to society that provides for the best conditions in which the human person may not only experience structural equality and justice but also live out the freedom we are called to. Whether this calling is from God or just the dynamism of human nature is not immediately essential to the political discussion on what is best for a society. What is best is that we find a workable solution to continue in this country’s ongoing project of the “pursuit of happiness,” a happiness that finds its roots and its ends in the dignity of the human person.

Though I do believe God cares about what we do and how we treat others, I know that living in a pluralist society means that one has to come up with sensitive language that is both rational and convincing. This language must be understandable and acceptable to the theist and the non-theist, to the Christian and the Jew, to the faithful and the secular. As a result, even religious-minded advocates of justice should find a way to speak across the denominational and non-religious aisles. Theological arguments are good and have their place, but in our society, we do need a language that addresses the same social concerns (as theological mandates for justice) and we need one that does so mindful of the many traditions within our midst. It is unfortunate but a fact of our reality that explicitly theological/confessional language in the public square often turns people off to the message advocated, however worthy the content is. This is where philosophy and the use of reason can come into play. This is where my current proposal can aid: in an effort to supply a rational and human dignity-respecting answer to the problem of the relationship of equality, justice, and freedom.

Lastly, I plan to relate these concerns and the conclusion to the mission of Loyola Marymount University, specifically its Jesuit character and stress on “the promotion of justice in the concern of the Hebrew scriptures for ‘the widow, the orphan, and the stranger in the land’ and the preference of the gospels for the ‘least’ of Jesus’ brothers and sisters.”[2] In doing so, I will also have shown that faith and reason actually are “like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth”[3] as they find agreement on the necessary political conditions for a society that truly serves the individual and common goods of a people in characterized with a certain human dignity.

[1] Cf. John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Essays in the History of Liberty, Vol. I (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1985), 22.
[2] Robert V. Caro, SJ, “Introduction: Understanding Our Identity,” Mission and Catholic Identity, Loyola Marymount University. 3 December 1990. . 28 March 2006.
[3] Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, Introductory “Blessing.” 14 September 1998. . 28 March 2006.

Event: Help me make it happen

Much of my reading, thinking, and praying has led me to attempts at a deeper understanding of "event." What is it? What constitutes it? What are the elements or necessary conditions of an event? The conditions of the possibility. And so on. Imagine the impact on a Christian existence if one were to apply this to the Last Supper, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, not to mention all the other happenings we take for granted in the history of the Church or in our own personal and local lives.

Aside from the essays I am already working on, I am beginning a more systematic research of "event." The philosophy of event. The theology of event. And all that good stuff. I have read a few thinkers on this: Msgr. Luigi Giussani, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Heidegger, Albacete. I am looking for discussion of this from Jean-Luc Marion (know of a few places but am looking for more), Josef Pieper, Romano Guardini, Fr. James V. Schall, Fr. Norris Clarke, Robert Sokolowski, Pope Benedict XVI (probably in his writings as Cardinal Ratzinger), and anyone else who can aid in the understanding and then living of the fact of events in our life.

I have found out about what seems to be a good article on this topic from Marion, but I can't find a copy of it. The article is from the Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, vol. 26, no. 1, and is titled, "Phenomenon and Event." If you have it, please send me a copy. Contact me via email or in comments.

As well, if you know of any other sources, please let me know. This will be part of my summer research.

"Being Fully Human"

Fr. Schall, SJ--once again--writes a good read as he reviews a new book by Monsignor Robert Sokolowski:

His Christian Faith & Human Understanding, just published by the Catholic University of America Press, is a masterpiece of good sense, clarity, profundity, and accuracy of expression.

Fr. Schall's article, "'Mystifying Indeed': On Being Fully Human," brings up an array of good points and things to consider in order to live a more "Fully Human" existence. He opens with a passage from page 161 of Sokolowski's new book:

"It is a curious thing that human beings spend so much energy denying their own spiritual and rational nature. No other being tries with such effort to deny that it is what it is. No dog or horse would ever try to show that it is not a dog or horse but only a mixture of matter, force, and accident. Man’s attempt to deny his own spirituality is itself a spiritual act, one that transcends space, time, and the limitations of matter. The motivations behind this self-denial are mystifying indeed." — Robert Sokolowski, "Soul and the Transcendent Meaning of Persons."

Then closes the essay referring back to the quoted passage:

In the beginning, I cited a passage from Sokolowski that remarked on how odd it is, "mystifying indeed," that man would take such efforts to deny what he is. If you want to know what modern man is most often denying, nothing will help you more than this book on faith and understanding. Sokolowski, referring to the German philosopher, Robert Spaemann, also cited Socrates and Christ as if they both belonged to the same overall discourse. He intimates that the understanding of both Socrates, the philosopher, and Christ, the Word made flesh, is necessary for the wonder of our intellectual lives, for our knowing the fullness of what is. To be a theologian means to be able to describe the content of revelation as handed down in precise and accurate terms. John Paul II said in Fides et Ratio that one needs also to be something of a philosopher. And to be a philosopher means to be open to what is, including to the something called revelation as referring to realities we must confront if we are to neglect nothing in being. No one in academic life embodies these two aspects of what a thinker is better than Robert Sokolowski.

Having read some of Sokolowski's works, I agree.

Jews and the Eucharist: Cardinal Ratzinger and a Lenten Retreat

Israel concelebrated the Eucharist with Jesus, in that they shared in the sufferings of the Servant of God.

In the book Journey towards Easter, a collection of retreat talks then-Cardinal Ratzinger gave in the Vatican in the presence of Pope John Paul II during the Lenten season of 1983, there is a chapter well worth reading and especially so during this time of the liturgical year. "Chapter 4: The Paschal Mystery." It is divided into four sections:

1. Holy Thursday

2. The Washing of the Feet

3. The Connection between the Last Supper, the Cross and the Resurrection

4. Risen on the Third Day.

I just finished the third section. There are some powerful and provocative thoughts here. Discussing the relation and root of the Songs of the Servant of God to understanding Jesus' death, Ratzinger writes:

He made of his death an act of prayer, an act of adoration. ... [H]e cried "with a loud voice" the opening words of Psalm 21, the great Psalm of the just man suffering and set free: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

... [T]his dying cry of Jesus was the messianic prayer of the great Psalm of Israel's suffering and hope, which concludes with the vision of the poor satisfied and all the ends of the earth returning to the Lord. ... [T]he whole story of the passion is shot through with the threads of this Psalm, weaving in and out continually in an interchange between words and reality. ... It thus becomes clear that Jesus is the true subject of this Psalm ....

... [W]hat took place at the Last Supper is an anticipation of the death, the transformation of the death into an act of love. ...

The death without the Supper would be empty, without meaning; the Supper without the actual realisation of the death it anticipated would be a gesture without reality. Supper and Cross together ... The Eucharist does not spring from the Supper alone; it springs from this oneness of Supper and Cross ....

Therefore the Eucharist is not simply Supper .... The Eucharist is the presence of Christ's Sacrifice, ... it is Christ distributing himself under the figure of bread and wine.

... "given for you", "poured out for many for the remission of sins". These words are found in the Songs of the Servant of God handed down to us in the book of the prophet Isaiah. These Songs presuppose the exilic period: Israel no longer has its Temple, the only legitimate place in which to adore God. So it seems exiled from God also--forlorn in the desert. No longer can sacrifices or expiation and praise be offered. The inevitable question arises: how can there now exist any relationship with God, on which depends the salvation of the people and of the world? In this passion, in this suffering of a life lived away from their homeland, a life far from their own culture, Israel underwent a new experience: the solemn praises of God could no longer be celebrated. The only possibility for drawing near to God was suffering for God. Inspired by the Holy Spirit, the Prophets understood that the suffering of believing Israel was the true sacrifice, the new liturgy, and that in this true liturgy Israel represented the world before the face of God. ... The hope found in their passion was that the suffering people were an anticipation of the true servant of God, and so, as 'sacramentum futuri' [a sacrament of things to come] , shared in his grace. By applying to the Last Supper these words about the Servant of God, Jesus says: I am this Servant of God. My passion and death are that definitive liturgy, that glorification of God which is the light and salvation of the world.

Here is where one experiences the preceding as a crescendo of sorts as Ratzinger builds up to then deliver the powerful and--to some or perhaps even to many--provocative lines about the people of Israel and their relation to the sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist:

Here we touch upon an important point for the celebration of the Eucharist. Israel concelebrated the Eucharist with Jesus, in that they shared in the sufferings of the Servant of God. To participate in the Eucharist, to communicate with the body and blood of Christ, demands the liturgy of our life, a sharing in the passion of the Servant of God. In this participation our sufferings become 'sacrifice' and so we can complete "in [our] flesh what is lacking in Christ's affliction" (Col 1, 24).

--Journey towards Easter, pp. 103-107. Emphases added.

"What Casey Sheehan Died For." A Must-See Video.

Buck Sargent at American Citizen Soldier posts some great thoughts and a must-see video (click here for video) on one reason for why we fight, on "What Casey Sheehan Died For."

Buck writes:

“What did my son die for?” A question better left to Iraqis themselves to answer. Take the mayor of Tall’Afar, Najim Abdullah Abid al-Jibouri:

“To the families of those who have given their holy blood for our land, we all bow to you in reverence and to the souls of your loved ones. Their sacrifice was not in vain. They are not dead, but alive, and their souls hovering around us every second of every minute. They will never be forgotten for giving their precious lives. They have sacrificed that which is most valuable. We see them in the smile of every child, and in every flower growing in this land. Let America, their families, and the world be proud of their sacrifice for humanity and life.”

Casey Sheehan was killed defending freedom on Palm Sunday.

Cindy, says Mayor Najim, let not your heart be hardened. Be not bitter, but proud. None that walk among us are immortal, and to bury a child is forever a tragedy. Yet your son lost his life in the most honorable manner possible. He died so that others may live.

I’d say that puts him in pretty good company.

No doubt. Very good company, indeed.

Catholic-Baptist Rivalries Heat Up ... Again

"Church Sign Smackdown!" is hilarious.

(HT: Mary Katharine Ham at Hugh)

Philosophical Kissing ... I think

This brings another meaning to: "O that you would kiss me with the kisses of your mouth!" (Song of Songs 1:2)

I recently came across the blog Per Caritatem, run by a philosophy-minded Texan. I know, quite a bit could be said about that. And good things too!

In one of her posts, "The Philosophy of Kissing," she links to a letter and the response wherein the writer considers not only what a platonic kiss is but also talks about the differences between the following:

Aristotelian kiss ...
Hegelian kiss: "Dialiptical technique in which the kiss incorporates its own antithikiss, forming a synthekiss."
Wittgensteinian kiss ...
Gödelian kiss ...

Then some more are considered:

· Socratic kiss. Really a Platonic kiss, but it's claimed to be the Socratic technique so it'll sound more authoritative; however, compared to most strictly Platonic kisses, Socratic kisses wander around a lot more and cover more ground.

· Kantian kiss. A kiss that, eschewing inferior "phenomenal" contact, is performed entirely on the superior "noumenal" plane; though you don't actually feel it at all, you are, nonetheless, free to declare it the best kiss you've ever given or received.

· Kafkaesque kiss. A kiss that starts out feeling like it's about to transform you but ends up just bugging you.

· Sartrean kiss. A kiss that you worry yourself to death about even though it really doesn't matter anyway.

· Russell-Whiteheadian kiss. A formal kiss in which each lip and tongue movement is rigorously and completely defined, even though it ends up seeming incomplete somehow.

· Pythagorean kiss. A kiss given by someone who has developed some new and wonderful techniques but refuses to use them on anyone for fear that others would find out about them and copy them.

· Cartesian kiss. A particularly well-planned and coordinated movement: "I think, therefore, I aim." In general, a kiss does not count as Cartesian unless it is applied with enough force to remove all doubt that one has been kissed. (cf. Polar kiss, a more well-rounded movement involving greater nose-to-nose contact, but colder overall.)

· Heisenbergian kiss. A hard-to-define kiss--the more it moves you, the less sure you are of where the kiss was; the more energy it has, the more trouble you have figuring out how long it lasted. Extreme versions of this type of kiss are known as "virtual kisses" because the level of uncertainty is so high that you're not quite sure if you were kissed or not. Virtual kisses have the advantage, however, that you need not have anyone else in the room with you to enjoy them.

· Nietzscheian kiss. "She/he who does not kiss you, makes your lust stronger."

· Zenoian kiss. Your lips approach, closer and closer, but never actually touch.

In response, Faith and Theology has added some of his own:

Augustine: You awaken me to delight in your mouth, and my lips are restless until they’re kissing you.

Luther: If the Word of God tells me to kiss, then I will kiss—and let the pope, the world and the devil be damned! [However, it should probably be added: unless I (Luther) consider that passage disagreeable to what I want God to say, in which case, I will call it an "epistle of straw," have the book thrown into the fire, and let kissing be damned!]

Adolf von Harnack: Jesus’ own simple teaching about kissing was immediately eclipsed by the early Christians’ Hellenistic approach to kissing.

Karl Barth: “I kiss you.” There are three related problems to consider here. I kiss you. I kiss you. I kiss you.

Hans Urs von Balthasar: Kissing is not only true and good, but it is beautiful.

Hans Küng: The Church’s approach to kissing is in urgent need of the most radical and most far-reaching reform.

Wolfhart Pannenberg: One’s first kiss is a proleptic anticipation of all that is still to come.

N. T. Wright: Every kiss is a dramatic enactment of our return from exile.

Billy Graham: Will you walk down the aisle and kiss me tonight? Will you do it tonight? You many never have another chance—you might be dead tomorrow!

Gerd Lüdemann: After many years of careful research, I have decided to kiss my faith goodbye.

Then Tortoise of Dissent adds another:

Stanley Hauerwas: "In the community established upon the principle of nonviolence, the question 'whom should I kiss' never arises - since to refuse to kiss is itself an act of violence. We kiss not because Jesus recommended it, but because in Jesus we discover that God is a kisser. So you'd all better damn well pucker up."

If you know anything about Hauerwas, that one was great.

In reading the comments, I found a patristic take on the whole thing:

Ignatius of Antioch: I can’t wait to kiss those lions!

Justin Martyr: Greek kisses and Jewish kisses were preparations for The Kiss.

Irenaeus: Those ridiculous Gnostics have invented 30 crazy ways to kiss and not one of them is
the True Kiss.

Tertullian: There will be no kissing! But I can provide you with a whole new Latin vocabulary on the subject.

Athanasius: A kiss is both human and divine.

Anselm: Why a kiss is satisfying.

Aquinas: Substantially, a kiss is no accident. [Elsewhere F & T noted his own Thomistic take on the matter: "There are five ways to prove the existence of a kiss...."]

Huss: Allow us to kiss with both lips!

Time to give someone a kiss. Where is she?

Is the Pope a Murderer? Wills Says "Sure"

Gary Wills is known for many things. Some consider him an authority on things Catholic. Others, however--and many of them--do not. I am one of the "others" in this regard.

On Tuesday, March 14, he was interviewed on Boston's NPR station.

In the interview, he is critical of just about everything the Catholic Church and the Christian Tradition represent. Some of his complaints were mentioned today by Dennis. In the interview, Wills goes on to blame the pope for the many deaths resulting from AIDS around the world. Huh? Yep. You got that right. Pope Benedict XVI, according to the mindset of Gary Wills, is "responsible for murder."

At about 18:14 of the interview, he says the following (which was transcribed by Catholic author and blogger Amy Welborn and can be found here):

Wills: There is..a message of life and love in the New Testament. Little of that comes out of Rome now. People are dying of AIDS all around the world now especially in places like Africa and Indonesia now, …when the Pope refuses to allow people to have contraception, he’s killing them. He’s responsible for murder. This is hardly a gospel of life and love.

Interviewer: You say that Pope Benedict is responsible for murder?

Wills: Sure, sure. More people are more resentful and hateful toward the Catholic Church because of that than because of the sexual molestation problem…sexual molesters are terrible it’s..you know here in Boston, but for the most part, not always, but for the most part they didn’t kill people. This is killing people on a grand scale, and it’s a horrendous scandal, much greater than any sexual molestation scandal.

Aside from Amy's take on this, which I suggest you read by clicking the link above, it troubles me that so many still regard Wills as an accurate or worthy commentator on Church affairs ... and ... moreover, that my favorite political afternoon radio host Hugh even quoted him as an authority on Church issues in his (Hugh's) book, In, But Not Of. Hugh needs to come back from his sabbatical, if not at least rely on more respectable and truth-telling commentators, which Gary Wills is not.

Pope Benedict XVI a murderer? I think not. Wake up, Wills. Your dream world is not reality and wishing it were does not make it so, however much NPR and the New York Times Book Review lets you think so.

George Clooney the Neo-Con?

Could it be true? Is George Clooney a Neo-Con?

Deep down under that liberal and Bush-bashing rhetoric, perhaps George Clooney is a true neo-conservative. Max Boot apparently thinks so:

DEAR George Clooney,

Congratulations on that best supporting actor Oscar you picked up last week. I couldn't be happier for you. Not only because I admire your Cary Grant-esque panache but because I admire your politics. As an advocate of a hawkish but high-minded foreign policy, I can't find much to cheer about in Hollywood, but you, my friend, consistently deliver. Dare I say it — you're the No. 1 neocon in Never Never Land.

Oh, I know you try to hide your real views behind a lot of progressive rhetoric. You've compared George W. Bush to Tony Soprano and warned that he's leading the country down the same road as Nazi Germany. I don't hold it against you; you gotta do what you gotta do in a liberal business. But your movies are what really count, and, no matter what you say, they've made the neocon case.

Even "Syriana," which has been criticized for its America-bashing by a lot of conservatives (myself included), has a neocon message. It's a protest against the influence of Big Oil on U.S. foreign policy. Neocons couldn't agree more. They argue that the policy supported by the oil companies — backing Middle Eastern despots — is leading us to ruin. It only helps create anti-American suicide bombers — as illustrated by "Syriana." The movie suggests that we should be helping liberal Arab reformers, like the fictional Prince Nasir, just as neocons have been urging.

Then there's "The Peacemaker," your terrific 1997 thriller that sought to shake the nation out of its post-Cold War complacency by showing how easily terrorists could smuggle a nuclear bomb into the U.S. Neocons in the 1990s were arguing for a more ruthless anti-terrorist policy. Your character, Lt. Col. Thomas Devoe, didn't let legal niceties stop him from saving New York.

All that is by way of prelude to your 1998 neocon masterpiece, "Three Kings." It showed that the 1991 Gulf War didn't achieve its goals when it left Saddam Hussein in power. Amid frenzied postwar celebrations, your character, Maj. Archie Gates, observes gloomily, "I don't even know what we did here." Neocons like Paul Wolfowitz were saying the same thing; they wanted to oust Hussein from power, not just from Kuwait.

You lead a group of three other soldiers to steal gold taken from Kuwait, but it soon becomes apparent that, despite your crusty exterior, you can't ignore the suffering of Iraqi Shiites who have risen up against Hussein at American instigation, only to be slaughtered. In the movie's pivotal scene, you watch as an Iraqi goon shoots a Shiite woman in the head. The Iraqi officer in charge is willing to let you leave with the loot. "You go now please," he pleads. "I don't think so," you growl. And then you beat up the Baathists on behalf of the Shiites.

The rest of the movie follows your attempts to get a group of 55 Shiites safely across the border to a refugee camp in Iran. Saving them isn't cheap — you lose most of your bullion, one of your soldiers is killed and another is badly wounded — but it's the right thing to do.

The message is clear: The U.S. should pursue its ideals in foreign policy, not simply try to protect its strategic or economic interests. Believe it or not, that is the essence of modern neoconservatism. And that is precisely the policy that President Bush has been following in Iraq, notwithstanding the sniping he's received from you and your friends.

Perhaps the problem is that you support the ends — getting rid of Hussein — but are leery of the military means. But what other alternative is there? As "Three Kings" showed, asking the Iraqi people to rise up against their oppressor wouldn't have worked. The U.S. had to step in, if only to make up for its betrayal of the Iraqis in 1991.

Anybody who wonders what U.S. troops are doing in Iraq today should rent "Three Kings." It makes an ironclad moral case for the invasion.

Good work, George. I'm looking forward to your next project: "Leo! The Leo Strauss Story."

I guess his real acting is when he's in public.

Now, what about this Leo Strauss guy? Where does he fit into all this?

Does Chuck Norris Exist? Hmmm.

Does Chuck Norris exist?

In what is probably one of the best posts I have read in a while, Tu Quoque--in typical Thomistic fashion--ponders over "The Existence of Church Norris."

As one comment had it, maybe this should be called "The Five Kicks." Here is most of it, though click the link to read the whole thing.

The Existence of Chuck Norris

Objection 1. It seems that Chuck Norris does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "Chuck Norris roundhouse kick" means that it is infinite painfulness. If, therefore, Chuck Norris existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore Chuck Norris does not exist.

On the contrary, It is said of Chuck Norris: "He hath counted to infinity - twice." (www.chucknorrisfacts.com)

I answer that, the existence of Chuck Norris can be proved in five ways . . .

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world roundhouse kicks are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of Chuck Norris’ enemy from actuality to potentiality. But nothing can be reduced from actuality to potentiality, except by something in a state of actuality. Therefore, roundhouse kicks must be put in motion by another. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first kicker, and, consequently, no kicked. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first kicker, kicked by no other; and this everyone understands to be Chuck Norris.

The second way is from the nature of the roundhouse kick. In the world of bar fights we find there is an order of roundhouse kicks. .... Therefore it is necessary to admit a first roundhouse kicker, to which everyone gives the name of Chuck Norris.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be roundhouse kicked and not to be, since they are found to be angering Chuck Norris and not angering Chuck Norris, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. .... Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own roundhouse kickedness, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity (and pain). This all men speak of as Chuck Norris.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in roundhouse kicks. Among roundhouse kicks there are some more and some less good, true, noble and painful. ....

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with the ability to kick its butt. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom these things are directed to their end; and this being we call Chuck Norris.

Reply to Objection 1. As Chuck Norris says: "I don't step on toes, I step on necks!” Since Chuck Norris is the hardest kicker, he would not allow any evil to exist unless his roundhouse kicks were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is part of the infinite badassness of Chuck Norris: that he should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good – the good of having something to roundhouse kick. [Emphasis added.]

Pope Benedict on the Qur'an, Pius XII, Women, Africa, Vatican II, and More

"Benedict XVI, Live. Fifteen Questions, and As Many Responses."

This is a "spontaneous dialogue between the pope and the priests of his diocese of Rome. On the Bible and the Qur’an, on Pius XII, on women in the Church, on Africa, on ecumenism, on the interpretation of the Council…"

With regard to the Bible and the Qur'an:

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BIBLE AND THE CHURCH AND ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BIBLE AND THE QUR’AN

No one believes purely on his own. We always believe in and with the Church. […] We must, in a manner of speaking, let ourselves fall into the communion of the faith, of the Church. Believing is, in itself, a Catholic act: it is a participation on this great certitude that is present in the living subject of the Church. This is also the only way for us to understand Sacred Scripture in the diversity of an interpretation that developed over thousands and thousands of years. It is a Scripture that is the expression of a subject, the People of God, that in its pilgrimage […] does not speak for itself, but as a subject created by God – the classical expression is “inspired” – receives, translates, and communicates this word. This synergy is very important. We know that the Qur’an, according to the Islamic faith, is a word literally given by God, without human mediation. The Prophet had no hand in it; he simply wrote it down and communicated it. It is the pure word of God. But for us, God enters into communication with us, he lets us cooperate with him; he creates this subject, and it is within this subject that his word grows and is developed. […] He who lives by the Word of God can live by it only because it is alive and vital within the living Church.

Winning in Iraq. How about at home? VDH.

Victor Davis Hanson is back from Iraq and here is one of his best: "At War With Ourselves: We're winning in Iraq. Let's not lose at home."

If many are determined to see the Iraqi war as lost without a plan, it hardly seems so to 130,000 U.S. soldiers still over there. They explain to visitors that they have always had a design: defeat the Islamic terrorists; train a competent Iraqi military; and provide requisite time for a democratic Iraqi government to garner public support away from the Islamists.

We point fingers at each other; soldiers under fire point to their achievements: Largely because they fight jihadists over there, there has not been another 9/11 here. Because Saddam is gone, reform is not just confined to Iraq, but taking hold in Lebanon, Egypt and the Gulf. We hear the military is nearly ruined after conducting two wars and staying on to birth two democracies; its soldiers feel that they are more experienced and lethal, and on the verge of pulling off the nearly impossible: offering a people terrorized from nightmarish oppression something other than the false choice of dictatorship or theocracy — and making the U.S. safer for the effort. [Emphases added.]

The secretary of defense, like officers in Iraq, did not welcome the war, but felt that it needed to be fought and will be won. Soldiers and civilian planners express confidence in eventual success, but with awareness of often having only difficult and more difficult choices after Sept. 11. Put too many troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we earn the wages of imperialism, or create a costly footprint that is hard to erase, or engender a dependency among the very ones in whom we wish to ensure self-reliance. Yet deploy too few troops, and instability arises in Kabul and Baghdad, as the Islamists lose their fear of American power and turn on the vulnerable we seek to protect.

In sum, after talking to our soldiers in Iraq and our planners in Washington, what seems to me most inexplicable is the war over the war — not the purported absence of a plan, but that the more we are winning in the field, the more we are losing it at home.

Culture Wars: Europe Waking Up

Must reading by Dennis: "First they came for Israel, then they came for America..." Curiously enough, the local Long Beach Press-Telegram entitled this column, "May the Better Culture Win."

Clash of Civilizations? Culture Clash?

I think this past week is the first time in a while that I have heard Hugh and Dennis so clearly disagree with each other. Dennis understands that what is going on right now between the West and the radicalized, fascist, and terrorist-minded faction of Islam is a clash, a war, or cultures. Hugh disagrees.

At least, Hugh does not want to call it that. Whether or not he thinks there really is not a war between these two groups or we just should not deem it such (for political purposes) is left unsaid. He just disagrees with the conclusion that there is a clash of civilizations going on. Perhaps he does not regard the Islamists as a real voice of Islam. Are they?

How does one decide who are the authentic voices of Islam? How does one decide who are those worthy of the name "Muslim"? This is difficult without some type of professed creed like Christians have or some type of basic laws, rules, or even faith to live by. Does not Islam have this? I thought so. Then can not the Islamists be regarded as a voice of Islam? Some say yes while others say no because of the violence they spread. I have even heard these Islamists described as a "perversion of Islam." If they are a perversion, what is authentic Islam? It seems there is Islam and there is the Islam many westerners would like it to be: a more peaceful, even Christian-like approach to faith with Muhammad regarded as the final prophet. Follow the Qur'an, they imply, but do so disregarding certain statements and ignoring how Islam was started and more importantly how it spread: by violence.

If we regard Islam as one whole, this is not a clash with all of Islam. We are not at war with Islam as a whole. However, if we separate the Islamists from civil-minded Muslims--as we are told to do so often by just about everybody--then it becomes apparent that there is a considerable group with an interpretation of Islam that is threatening to all non-Muslims. These are adherents of Islam who advocate forms of terrorism, thus Islamists. Further, these Islamists have cultivated their own ways and developed a culture all its own. See certain areas of the Islamic world for examples. Therefore, there is an Islamist culture and, moreover, we are at war with it. Q. E. D. Thus it can be said and perhaps must be said: There is a clash of cultures, a clash of civilizations.

Hugh, you sound too much like advocates of the war who will not acknowledge that this is not particularly a "war on terror" but is more accurately a "war on Islamic Terror." "Naming the Enemy" does a good job of explaining this point.

Yesterday, Hugh interviewed Dennis Prager, Michael Medved, and Joe Carter. Here are some highlights:

HH: Now I want to ask whether or not, in our little time in this segment and the last one, is a wider conflict with Islam inevitable, ... ?

....

HH: But how do you win the war, Dennis Prager?

DP: If the West believed in something, it would prevail overnight. The problem is you can't beat bad faith with no faith. [Emphasis added.]

HH: But...free press is not what you win with.

DP: You can't beat good faith.

HH: I mean, the idea that a free press, that's not the good that wins the war, is it, Dennis?

MM: I actually think that it is, and I think that one of the things that is positive about this horrible situation, and it is a horrible situation, is aligning some secularists who previously maybe had not fully acknowledged the tremendous danger of the Islamist message.

DP: Yup.

MM: I mean, there are secular leftists who I think are waking up, particularly in Europe.

HH: All right. When we come back, final comments from Dennis Prager, Michael Medved and Joe Carter on the controversy as it escalates, and what, if anything, the United States government ought to say. Clearly, it's not going to say don't publish anything. It can't and it shouldn't. But what should it say about the controversy?

...

DP: The greatest disgrace to Islam is not the cartoons in a Danish paper. It's the great number of Muslims who murder in the name of Allah. [Emphasis added.]

...

HH: Quick question. Do you have sympathy for peaceable Muslims who have protested these cartoons?

MM: If it was a peaceful protest? Sure. Why not?

HH: Dennis?

DP: No, because they're...if they didn't protest the infinitely greater persecution of Christians in the Sudan, and by other Muslim societies, then their moral barometer is broken.

HH: Joe?

JC: I'd have to agree with Dennis on that one. I think the Muslim world should hope to get to the point where they can flagellate themselves for cartoons. I think they've got bigger issues to worry about.

There is so much to say in response. The most important line, it seems, is Dennis's: "If the West believed in something, it would prevail overnight. The problem is you can't beat bad faith with no faith."

Islamism can be beat, as it was near the Gates of Vienna back in 1683. It can be beat by those who believe in something and are willing to sacrifice and die for that something. Even greater when that something is real, true, and grace-providing: the freedom and virtue that we are called to live. Whether Christian or not, those who strongly believe in something will prove victorious in this war. I just pray it is the Western, democratic, and freedom-loving individual.

Radical Orthodoxy

Radical Orthodoxy has come up in discussions lately. What is it?

According to Fr. Aidan Nichols, OP,

The Institute of Radical Orthodoxy is the brainchild of three Anglicans: John Milbank, who is moving from Cambridge to the University of Virginia; and two other people from Cambridge: Graham Ward, the Dean of Peterhouse, who is going to Manchester; and Catherine Pickstock, who is a Fellow of Emmanuel College. They have formed a definite school that has disciples.

Their line is that postmodernism is the natural result of the way that Western philosophy has developed. That is to say, the postmodernist critique of Western philosophy is irrefutable in terms of what it is attacking, but postmodernism itself is nothing but nihilism dressed up in fancy clothes. And therefore, the only remedy is the Holy Trinity!

They basically argue that all of the errors or false directions or insoluble problems in the Western philosophical tradition stem from misunderstandings of theology and of revelation. The only remedy is to go back to the source by renewal of a revelatory mode of thinking, which has the Holy Trinity as its center. That is the basic idea, roughly speaking, of Radical Orthodoxy, as I understand it.

It is an overwhelmingly Anglican movement. To be fair, it has been described as a theology in search of an ecclesiology. I would say it’s the first major theological movement in England since the South Bank school of John Robinson, which was a sort of warmed-up Tillich and so much less original.

Just in case that does not help, you can also check these out:

"The Radical Orthodoxy Project" by R. R. Reno

Radical Orthodoxy’s proponents, then, have constructive as well as critical ambitions, and in the long run the constructive ambitions are the more important. Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward hope to articulate an encompassing Christian perspective that will supersede and replace secularisms both modern and postmodern. Their goal is to uncover a "new theology," new because it renounces the mediations and compromises of so–called modern theology. Yet their positive achievement is uneven, and understanding the failures of Radical Orthodoxy should occasion some sobering thoughts about the way forward. A genuinely postmodern theology requires spiritual disciplines very alien to our terribly creative and rebellious late–modern souls.

However deeply invested Radical Orthodoxy might be in the vocabulary, thought forms, and literature of postmodernism, it rests on a different foundational assumption about what we might call the glue that holds the world together. It is Augustine’s vision of heavenly peace, made effective in the dynamic and binding power of divine purpose, that shapes Radical Orthodoxy’s reflections, not Nietzsche’s violence wrought by an omnipotent will–to–power. This difference allows Radical Orthodoxy to interpret postmodern thought without being drawn into its orbit, giving Milbank & Co. the perspective from which to expose the nakedness of postmodern nihilism.

Then there is this book review by Douglas A. Ollivant: "Thomism Unwhigged." It may not be an article on Radical Orthodoxy per se, but it does mention similar concerns.

And lastly .... for now ... is this somewhat related piece from today's Opinion Journal: "An 'Ordinary Radical'" by Paul Beston. Though I like the subtitle, "A 'Jesus freak' becomes an 'extremist for love'," I take issue with some of the claims of the "extremist for love."

Beston does a decent job of pointing out some of the problems. I would add more, such as why just-war theory did not have a reason to be publicly taught during the Early Church. It was not like there were many Christians with the power and the authority to pursue war.

As well, real and consistent pacifism has not had an honorable history: how can Christian charity tolerate the butcher, rape, and mass murder of innocents?

Living in a Material World

This morning, Dennis posed a question regarding getting/having material goods. He asked if there was anything wrong with seeking and getting material items that are beyond the mere necessity.

In discussing piano purchases, he further asked, "If someone is considering purchasing a piano and the choices are between one that is $1,000 and another that is $15,000, is purchasing the less expensive one more noble?" Noble? Is it a matter of nobility? Or prudence?

Anyway, many callers rang and seemed to voice concerns and worries that sounded somewhat manichean or spiritualist. Material goods are neither good nor evil. In a sense, they are neutral. It depends partially upon how they are used. The goods in themselves have no inherent moral value. That morality comes in when consideration is given to how the goods were made, how they were attained, and how they are used.

Creation is good. It is to be used according to its nature. Each item of the material world is to be used according to the nature of the item, according to "what it is for." Very simple.

To say that a wealthy man who tithes generously and demonstrates great concern for those who have considerably less errs because he spends on material items for himself and his loved ones is wrong, misguided, and unrealistic.

We are material beings and so we are made to use the material world. To use it for our enjoyment. To use it for our work. To use it for our betterment. To use it. However, we must use it responsibly, which means that we should use "things" from the material world according to what they are for, according to their natures. Material "things" can be abused and misused, yes, but they necessarily are not so.

Attempts to strive beyond the material world and live a "human" life rejecting the material is really rejecting the "human" part of the life of the human person. Without grace, it is to attempt to be like angels ... and, as has been said countless times, ... when men attempt to be like angels, they quite often end up like devils.

So enjoy the material. Just do it in moderation and with prudence. Perhaps that is what Dennis should have been stressing: moderation and the prudential use of things. Now it is time to play some more CD's and listen to music while I continue to work on the computer and read a book.

Too Much 24?

Had too much 24? Not me.

But apparently some have: check this out.

Language and Liberty: Civil Rights and Abortion

With two recent events in mind, MLK Day and the anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision, I decided to post an essay from undergrad days. This is from the student newspaper, San Francisco Foghorn. It caused quite a storm and not a few angry letters to the editor. Those days were fun.

One change is made to the essay (with regard to how many years have passed) to correspond to this year's anniversary of the Supreme Court decision.


17 Jan 98

Language and Liberty

This country recently commemorated two events: Martin Luther King, Jr. Day and the ... [thirty-third] anniversary of Roe v. Wade. They are related by similar concerns: freedom and equality for all. Recalling the former sheds some light on the latter.

The fundamental source of King’s message is “the moral law or the law of God.” This law binds all humans in granting liberty and demanding justice. As history has shown, unfortunately, man-made law does not always conform to this greater and higher law. When a law, as Rev. King put it, is “out of harmony” with the universal law, it is an “unjust law” and thus no law at all. During the American experience, there have been many unjust laws. In fact, this country was founded in response to unjust laws.

Rooting himself in a tradition that incorporates America’s Founding Fathers, King suggested a response: disobedience. However, the disobedience of King is not a license to do anything. It is a morally-superior response to grave injustice. He writes, “One who breaks an unjust law must do it openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for law.”

This disobedience of King is his extremism. It is a truly morally-uplifting extremism. For King, the question “is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremist will we be.” This sense of action rooted in justice harkens back to the abolitionists of the mid-1800s. “I will be as harsh as truth,” David Walker wrote in 1831, “and as uncompromising as justice.” Faced with the great deprivation of rights in the battle against slavery, Walker continued to voice his commitment to endure and persevere against any and all injustice, “On this subject [of slavery] I do not wish to think, or speak, or write with moderation....I am in earnest—I will not equivocate –I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch—and I will be heard.” I am sure King felt the same sentiment and passion for his cause of true justice and liberty for all.

The Declaration of Independence asserts that “all men are created equal” with the same “unalienable rights” of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Slavery and many laws of the early and mid-1900s were not in harmony with this truth of the Declaration and this is what King and Walker attested to.

They were arguing against a system at odds with itself. The black American was considered a “subordinate and inferior class of being,” “an article of property,” and even “not a person.” This abuse of language was the legal foundation upon which racist attitudes could translate into discrimination and acts of evil. What happened to “all men are created equal”?

The abuse of language is part of what happened. “When words lose their meaning,” Confucius once said, “peoples lose their liberty.” This is probably one of the greatest evils of man: Deny the full personhood or humanity of those we do not like and then we have the legal justification to discriminate, segregate, enslave, and even murder in mass numbers (e.g., the Holocaust).

Before being elected President, Abraham Lincoln joined in the debate over the evil of slavery: “‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’ I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.” He went on to later voice his concern over the abuse of language and the relative manner by which men selectively acknowledged humanity in others: “I should like to know if taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making exceptions to it, where will it stop. If one man says it does not mean a Negro, why not another say it does not mean some other man?”

Some other man? Yes. Today, society has found another, but this time, this “other” is a baby. The unborn baby! The humanity of the child in the womb is unquestionably affirmed by science. The zygote “results from fertilization of an oocyte by a sperm and is the beginning of a human being.” (The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology, 1) Besides, what else could the entity be? If the natural and physical source is human (the mother and father), then the result (the new life) will be human. Basic common sense. Thus, the entity in the womb who is often torn apart in an abortion is none other than a little defenseless child, the most vulnerable of all human life. What do these issues all have to do with each other, one might ask?

The answer is simple. The attempt to redefine a human person, whether it is with regard to black Americans, Jews, or even the child in the womb, is nothing but “semantic gymnastics,” as one critic (William Brennan) put it. Again, the words of Confucius reveal great wisdom, “When words lose their meaning, peoples lose their liberty.” And, I might add, their lives!

One should never forget where our rights and privileges come from. The rights to property, free speech, religion, liberty, etc. are great, but what roots them? It is the right to life. It is my right to keep and maintain my life which no one on earth has sovereignty over. Sincere and unbiased seekers of justice and liberty must acknowledge that at conception, a new human being is present. Since this new being is human, all rights predicated to a human as basic must be predicated to all humans, whether they be Black, Jewish, disabled, elderly, or even a young human in the womb. This young human being is a person with rights that must be protected. What good are all the other rights if we forego the right to life? It is the right upon which all others are rooted. Without it, the others are worthless.

Rev. King had a dream where “all men...would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” It is a dream where the nation’s people would “not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.” Today, we still face the test of our character. We made it through the evils of slavery and racist laws. Now, we face the test with abortion. How we treat the defenseless is a true mark of our character. With slavery and the Holocaust, this country was involved in bloody wars. The same need not happen to save the unborn child. However, true seekers of justice for all will not back down. The question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremist we will be. We do not wish to think, or speak, or write with moderation. We are in earnest. We will not equivocate. We will not excuse. We will not retreat a single inch. And we will be heard: Direct abortions are the unjust killing of innocent human beings, of little children! Life is not negotiable and neither are the passions and principles of those who truly seek liberty and justice for all, as we will be as harsh as truth and as uncompromising as justice!

Frey and Emotional Truth. More fiction than fact?

Truth. What is truth?

Now, we have "emotional truth." Huh? Well, ask James Frey, author of A Million Little Pieces, the book that is now subject to much criticism since

In an interview on CNN's "Larry King Live" on Wednesday, Frey admitted embellishing some details of the book, but insisted that was part of the memoir-writing business. He also said that "the emotional truth is there."

His insistence that people who write memoirs are not writing what he called journalistic truth touched a raw nerve, especially among journalists, editors and writers who publicly question whether writing a memoir should be a license to lie.

The controversy has not died down as this article attests: "Pundits attack author Frey and unhappy reader sues."

In a related post, Ignatius Insight Scoop has a humorous take on the whole thing:

In a related story*, Pontius Pilate has released his memoirs, translated from the original Latin and published by Random Hose, titled What Is Truth? Sources say that Pilate argues that truth is "essentially emotional" and also "emotionally essential." Pilate could not be reached for comment since he is currently dead.

(* Brief Author's Note: This paragraph contains true content that is embellished by content that is not true, but supports the desire of the author and publisher to sell books.)

The Conair 2000: It Blows Hard. Noonan on Democrat Senators.

Hugh is right. Peggy Noonan does tell us how things are and does so beautifully:

Must he sit there bland-faced and unmoving as they say what they say? Yes, of course. Judge Alito and the White House know they have to let these men talk. They don't want the senators to feel resentful or frustrated. They know each senator feels he has to play to his base. They know the senators are, by nature, like Conair 2000 hairdryers: They just love to blow, and hard. Fwwaaaaahhhhhhhhh. And they know it is good, it is helpful, to let each senator reveal himself through his own words. I think senators feel that their words, when strung together, become little bridges. I think the White House feels that their words, when strung together, become little nooses.

Conair 2000! That is hilarious! What a comparison!

Earlier in the essay, Peggy Noonan writes:

I wish they would be, thought they could be, honest. "You are bad because you are not a liberal, and I am a liberal so I vote against you. Feh." "Of course I think Roe v. Wade was badly thought through, and you probably admit as much yourself, enator, in your private thoughts."

...

But here's where the issue clears some air. Either liberals like Ted Kennedy really believe that conservatives harbor deep in their hearts an animus toward women, and blacks, and Hispanics, and everyone who is not a white male, or liberals simply enjoy, for reasons that are cynical and perhaps also psychological ("The people I fight are bad; this buttresses my belief that I, in spite of what I know about myself, am good"), suggesting that conservatives are full of narrow-minded bigotry and hatred. Maybe a Republican senator could bring this question to the floor, and ask Pat Leahy or Mr. Kennedy. The thing is, it is a mystery: Do they really think that about us, or are they just playing games and jerking everyone around?

Also: wouldn't it be nice if the senators suggesting bigotry apologized to Mrs. Alito for causing her distress? Oh, I wish they'd apologize to the country for causing it distress. Anyway, they made a mistake. Her tears presage his victory.

...

Let's cause some senators distress. The great thing about Joe Biden during the Alito hearings, the reason he is, to me, actually endearing, is that as he speaks, as he goes on and on and spins his long statements, hypotheticals, and free associations--as he demonstrates yet again ... that he is incapable of staying on the river of a thought, and is constantly lured down tributaries from which he can never quite work his way back--you can see him batting the little paddles of his mind against the weeds, trying desperately to return to the river but not remembering where it is, or where it was going. I love him. He's human, like a garrulous uncle after a drink.

In this, in the hearings, he is unlike Ted Kennedy in that he doesn't seem driven by some obscure malice--Uh, I, uh, cannot, uh, remembuh why I hate you, Judge Alioto, but there, uh, must be a good reason and I will, um, damn well find it. When he peers over his glasses at Judge Alito he is like an old woman who's unfortunately senile and quite sure the teapot on the stove is plotting against her. Mr. Biden is also unlike Chuck Schumer in that he doesn't ask questions with an air of, With this one I'm going to trap you and leave you flailing like a bug in a bug zapper--we're going to hear your last little crackling buzz any minute now!

Knowledge Not Power; Hugh, Fr. Fessio, Benedict, and Islam

Computer still down, so still light blogging, but here are some items worth reading:

Knowledge is Not Power and Other Paradoxes by Fr. James Schall, SJ, one of my favorite essayists.

"Pope Benedict XVI condemned terrorism as a 'moral perversion' and demanded religious freedom around the globe Monday in an annual foreign-policy speech to Vatican-based diplomats. "

Hugh Hewitt posted his interview with Fr. Joseph Fessio, SJ.

Yesterday I interviewd Father Jospeh Fessio, Provosty of Ave Maria University in Naples, Florida, and student and friend of Benedict XVI. (Father Fessio is also the founder of Ignatius Press.) The entire interview should be read, and the transcript is here, but the most fascinating part concerned a gathering at Castle Gandolfo with the Pope and his students this past September, where the subject was Islam.

Wherein, Hugh and Fr. Fessio said:

HH: Father Fessio, before the break, you were telling us that after the presentation at Castel Gandolfo by two scholars of Islam this summer with Benedict in attendance, as well as his former students, for the first time in your memory, the Pope did not allow his students to first comment and reserve comment, but in fact, went first. Why, and what did he say?

JF: Well, the thesis that was proposed by this scholar was that Islam can enter into the modern world if the Koran is reinterpreted by taking the specific legislation, and going back to the principles, and then adapting it to our times, especially with the dignity that we ascribe to women, which has come through Christianity, of course. And immediately, the Holy Father, in his beautiful calm but clear way, said well, there's a fundamental problem with that, because he said in the Islamic tradition, God has given His word to Mohammed, but it's an eternal word. It's not ohammed's word. It's there for eternity the way it is. There's no possibility of adapting it or interpreting it, whereas in Christianity, and Judaism, the dynamism's completely different, that God has worked through His creatures. And so, it is not just the word of God, it's the word of Isaiah, not just the word of God, but the word of Mark. He's used His human creatures, and inspired them to speak His word to the world, and therefore by establishing a Church in which he gives authority to His followers to carry on the tradition and interpret it, there's an inner logic to the Christian Bible, which permits it and requires it to be adapted and applied to new situations. I was...I mean, Hugh, I wish I could say it as clearly and as beautifully as he did, but that's why he's Pope and I'm not, okay? That's one of the reasons. One of others, but his seeing that distinction when the Koran, which is seen as something dropped out of Heaven, which cannot be adapted or applied, even, and the Bible, which is a word of God that comes through a human community, it was stunning.

Child Rapist Gets 60 Days

This is sick, and it just goes to show how serious is the trouble with judges in this country.

Rapist's Prison Sentence Triggers Outrage

Burlington, Vermont -- January 4, 2005

There was outrage Wednesday when a Vermont judge handed out a 60-day jail sentence to a man who raped a little girl many,many times over a four-year span starting when she was seven.

The judge said he no longer believes in punishment and is more concerned about rehabilitation.

Prosecutors argued that confessed child-rapist Mark Hulett, 34, of Williston deserved at least eight years behind bars for repeatedly raping a littler girl countless times starting when she was seven.

But Judge Edward Cashman disagreed explaining that he no longer believes that punishment works. "The one message I want to get through is that anger doesn't solve anything. It just corrodes your soul," said Judge Edward Cashman speaking to a packed Burlington courtroom. Most of the on-lookers were related to a young girl who was repeatedly raped by Mark Hulett who was in court to be sentenced. The sex abuse started when the girl was seven and ended when she was ten. Prosecutors were seeking a sentence of eight to twenty years in prison, in part, as punishment.

"Punishment is a valid purpose," Chittenden Deputy Prosecutor Nicole Andreson argued to Judge Edward Cashman.

"The state recognizes that the court may not agree or subscribe to that method of sentencing but the state does. The state thinks that it is a very important factor for the court to consider," Andreson added.

But Judge Cashman explained that he is more concerned that Hulett receive sex offender treatment as rehabilitation. But under Department of Corrections classification, Hulett is considered a low-risk for re-offense so he does not qualify for in-prison treatment.So the judge sentenced him to just 60 days in prison and then Hulett must complete sex treatment when he gets out or face a possible life sentence.

Judge Cashman also also revealed that he once handed down stiff sentences when he first got on the bench 25 years ago, but he no longer believes in punishment.

"I discovered it accomplishes nothing of value;it doesn't make anything better; it costs us a lot of money; we create a lot of expectation, and we feed on anger,"Cashman explained to the people in the court.

The sentence outraged the victim's family who asked not to be identified. "I don't like it," the victim's mother,in tears, told Channel 3. "He should pay for what he did to my baby and stop it here. She's not even home with me and he can be home for all this time, and do what he did in my house," she added.

Hulett -- who had been out on bail-- was taken away to start his sentence immediately.